Methane is the second most prevalent greenhouse gas and has a global warming potential at least 28 times as high as carbon dioxide. Municipal solid waste landfills are reported to be the third-largest source of anthropogenic methane emissions in the United States, responsible for 18 percent of emissions in 2011. Capturing landfill gas for use as an energy source for electricity or heat produces alternative energy as well as environmental benefits. A host of federal and state policies encourage the development of landfill-gas-to-energy projects. Our research provides the first systematic economic assessment of the role these policies play in adoption decisions. Results suggest that renewable portfolio standards and investment tax credits have contributed to the development of these projects, accounting for 13 of 277 projects during our data period from 1991 to 2010. These policy-induced projects have led to 12.5 million metric tons of carbon dioxide-equivalent reductions in greenhouse gas emissions and a net benefit of $52.59 million.
Introduction
Methane is the second most prevalent anthropogenic greenhouse gas emitted in the United States and has a global warming potential 28-34 times higher than carbon dioxide over a 100-year time horizon (IPCC 2013) . Municipal solid waste landfills are the third-largest source of human-made methane emissions in the United States, responsible for 18 percent of methane emissions in 2012 (US EPA 2014). Landfill gas (LFG) produced through the anaerobic decomposition of the organic content of municipal solid waste consists of 50-55 percent methane and 40-45 percent carbon dioxide. Methane is a primary constituent of natural gas and an important energy source. As a result, landfill gas energy (LFGE) projects-which capture methane emissions from landfills and use it as an energy source for electricity or heat generation-provide both energy and environmental benefits.
LFG can be used for a variety of energy projects, including electricity generation, combined heat and power, direct use, and fuel for vehicles. Since the first LFGE project started operation in Marina City, California, in 1983, the number of LFGE projects gradually increased until 2007 and then dramatically thereafter. As of January 2014, LFGE projects were running at 636 of approximately 2,400 municipal solid waste landfills, representing a total of 2,032 megawatts of electricity generating capacity, generating 16.5 billion kilowatt hours (kWh) of electricity per year, and delivering 317 million cubic feet per day of LFG to direct-use applications. The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has identified an additional 450 landfill sites for the potential development of energy projects.
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A variety of federal and state energy policies can play a role in shaping the incentives of landfill owners to develop LFGE projects. We offer the first systematic economic study of the effects of public policies on the decision of landfill owners to develop LFGE projects. We focus on four polices: investment tax credits (ITC) that cover a portion of the fixed cost, production tax credits (PTC) that provide credits based on the amount of energy output, state-level grants for renewable energy investments, and renewable portfolio standards (RPSs) that require utilities to acquire or generate a minimum percentage of their electricity sales from renewable energy sources. RPSs have been adopted by 29 states and the District of Columbia. In most of these states, LFGE sources are eligible to meet the standards.
Understanding the effect of these policies on landfill operations and LFGE investment decisions can provide guidance for policymakers in designing efficient policies to promote these projects. To inform our econometric analysis, we held discussions with the Landfill Methane Outreach Program of the USEPA and interviewed landfill and LFGE facilities managers and industry experts. Our analysis also builds on studies of landfill economics (Macauley 2010; Walls et al. 2005 ) and the economics of a related activity that uses anaerobic digesters to generate and collect methane gas from manure associated with animal husbandry to generate electricity (Shih et al. 2008) .
The empirical analysis is based on data from nearly all landfills in the United States from 1991 to 2010. Our econometric model includes a spectrum of variables that affect the decision process, including characteristics of landfills (e.g., age, size, and ownership), weather conditions, electricity and natural gas prices, and renewable energy policies. Our preferred specification to understand LFGE project investment decisions is a random-effects logit model that controls for state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and landfill unobservables.
The estimation results identify several factors other than policies that affect LFGE adoption decisions. First, high natural gas prices, implying higher output (electricity or gas) prices, help the adoption of LFGE projects. Second, a long distance to the electricity grid hinders the adoption of LFGE projects by limiting the market opportunities for electricity sales. Third, publicly owned landfills are less likely than privately owned ones to adopt LFGE projects. This finding may reflect stronger incentives among private proprietors to pursue additional sources of income compared to public officials operating local landfills for waste management only.
Of the four policies evaluated, the estimation shows that RPSs and ITCs have positive and statistically significant effects on the development of LFGE projects, while PTCs and state grants do not. The simulation results based on the parameter estimates suggest that these two policies account for the development of 13 out of 277 LFGE projects. That is, without these two policies, we would have seen 13 fewer LFGE projects among the landfills in the states subject to either of the two policies at some point in time during our data period from 1991 to 2010. These policy-induced projects have led to 12.5 million metric tons of carbon dioxide-equivalent (CO 2 e) reductions in greenhouse gas emissions and a net benefit of $52.59 million.
A cost-benefit analysis based on our simulation results and benefit estimates from existing studies (Interagency Working Group 2013; Palmer et al. 2010) suggests that the ITC is a cost-effective policy that significantly reduces greenhouse gas emissions. The seven projects induced by the ITC bring a net social benefit of from $69.9 million to $217.7 million, assuming a discount rate of 3 percent and 5 percent, respectively. The net benefit from the six LFGE projects induced by the RPS is highly dependent on the discount rate, ranging from a $17.3 million loss to a $109.4 million net gain as the discount rate moves from 3 percent to 5 percent.
We organize the remainder of this paper as follows: Section 2 provides background information for LFGE projects in the United States, Section 3 discusses the policies that offer incentives for LFGE projects, Section 4 presents the data, Section 5 shows the empirical method, Section 6 describes estimation results and policy simulations, and Section 7 concludes.
Industry Background
Landfill gas is generated from a chain of physical, chemical, and microbial (bacterial activities) processes that occur in the waste. The most important of these is the anaerobic decomposition of organic waste, which takes place over the course of 10 to 80 or more years.
Appreciable amounts of LFG are produced within 1 to 3 years of waste placement, peaking 5 to 7 years after. Landfills usually operate for many decades and can thus provide a sustained flow of gas, with the typical LFGE project in our data operating for about 15 years. The amount of LFG is most related to the amount of organic matter in the landfills. In addition, warmer temperatures and sufficient moisture content assist microbial activity and increase the production of LFG. To generate energy, the gas is first collected from the waste by way of gas extraction wells distributed throughout the landfill. A gas collection pipe connects the wells and directs the gas to a central point for processing and treating tailored to the ultimate use of the gas. LFGE projects differ depending on how the LFG is used. An electricity generation project uses technologies such as engines, turbines, microturbines, or fuel cells to generate electricity from LFG. The generated power is used on-site or transmitted through the power grid and sold to consumers. A direct-use project uses the LFG to heat boilers, kilns, greenhouses, or other thermal applications. A cogeneration plant uses LFG for both thermal energy production and electricity generation and can be especially attractive for its efficiency.
There are about 2,400 currently operating or recently closed landfills throughout the United States (closed landfills can be used for LFGE projects). As of January 2014, 636 of these were operating LFGE projects and an additional 450 were classified by EPA as candidates for LFGE (see Figure 1) . California has the largest number of projects (76) of all the states, and Pennsylvania follows with 44. Table 1 shows the breakdown of 560 LFGE projects operated in 2010 by type. Among these projects, 410 (about two-thirds) were electricity generation and 150 were direct-use applications. The total electric generation capacity was more than 1,700 megawatts, and collectively these landfills produced about 300 million standard cubic feet of LFG per day in direct-use applications. The costs of an LFGE project include construction, installation, operation and maintenance. These costs can be mitigated by grants, low-interest loans, investment tax credits, and sales tax exemption. The main revenue from an LFGE project depends importantly on the electricity price or the natural gas price. The price of electricity or gas from this source might command a premium due to renewable portfolio standards or green power purchase initiatives. In addition to the energy sales revenue, the project owner may be able to sell Renewable Energy Credits (RECs) or receive production incentive or production tax credits for every unit of energy sold. Chen and Green (2003) find an average cost of 4-5 cents for an LFGE project to generate a kWh of electricity. This amount exceeds the wholesale electricity price of 2.5-3 cents during the study period and would suggest that LFGE projects are infeasible. However, the various incentives discussed below increase the chance that the projects breakeven.
Government Policies
We focus on four types of government policies that offer incentives to LFGE projects: renewable portfolio standards, production tax credits, investment tax credits, and state grants.
The RPS requires utility companies to supply a designated portion of their electricity from renewable energy sources, such as wind, solar, biomass, or other alternatives to fossil and nuclear electricity generation. Each of the 30 states that have a mandatory RPS target specifies the eligible types of renewable energy sources as well as the types of utility companies that are subject to the standard. In addition to using or procuring renewable energy to satisfy the mandated state RPS, most states allow utilities to use renewable energy credits to satisfy their RPS requirements. When a landfill gas to energy facility is included as an eligible technology under an RPS then it is able to obtain revenue both from the electricity it sells and also from the sale of renewable energy credits. As shown in Figure 3 Figure 5 shows the number of states that offer production tax credits each year.
Investment tax credits are granted for installation of a renewable energy facility and primarily take the form of a percentage of the cost to construct the system. Seven states have an ITC policy, and the rate ranges from 10 percent in Kansas to 100 percent in Kentucky, with an average of 35 percent. Figure 6 shows the number of states that have adopted the ITC between 1990 and 2012. According to a report produced by the Natural Resources Defense Council, the cost of building an LFGE project varies from $850,000 to $4.5 million, while a typical project costs $1.5 million to build (Chen and Greene 2003) . This would mean that a typical landfill project that accepts an average amount of ITC would still need to procure $1 million.
Many states provide funds to applicants who submit proposals to develop renewable energy. The number of states that adopted such grants between 1990 and 2012 are given in Figure 7 . The amounts of the grant and eligibility requirements vary across grant programs. For example, some of the state grants are for innovative technologies-that is, those that have not been commercialized. Some of the grants have size or cost requirements or are targeted to fund research by municipalities and public schools; other grant programs require that a facility be located in the service territory of the state's major utilities. Yet other grants are offered only to projects that have on-site power use. Many of these programs require that the project generate electricity.
Data Description
Our econometric analysis draws largely from two data sets. The first is panel data for all landfills and LFGE projects in the United States and a set of landfill-, county-, and state-level variables from 1991 to 2010. The database includes operational LFGE and potential landfill sites for LFGE from the EPA Landfill Methane Outreach Program. 2 We augment the data with wholesale electricity prices, demographic data, age of the landfill, landfill site-grid interconnection distance, competing renewable energy resources, potential nearby end-users, and local climate and hydrologic conditions.
The second data set is a database on state tax incentives and RPS policies from 1991 to 2010. Based on the Database on State Incentives on Renewable Energy and Efficiency, 3 we create several policy variables that are quantitative in nature and can be used directly in the econometric analysis. Table 2 shows the summary statistics of the data used for analysis. There are 27,311 observations in the data for the 1,773 distinct landfills with complete information. We exclude landfills that began an LFGE project before 1991. Among the 1,773 landfills, 630 adopted an LFGE project during the data period.
The LFGE dummy, the dependent variable in the analysis, is assigned a value of one if there is an LFGE project in that landfill in a given year. The explanatory variables include three categories: government policies, electricity and natural gas prices, and landfill characteristics that determine the methane production potential.
The first category encompasses the four policy variables that provide financial incentives for landfill owners to adopt an LFGE project: renewable portfolio standards, production tax credits, investment tax credits, and state grants. For the RPS, the average target is 1.04 percent with a range from 0 percent to 32 percent during 1991 to 2010. Most states have various tiers within their RPS. The tiers refer to requirements that a specified portion of the renewable energy obligation be met with certain resources or class of resources. For the purpose of this study, the RPS policy variable only considers the primary RPS and tiers that include landfill gas as an eligible energy source.
The production tax credit variable has a non-zero value if the state in which the landfill is located had a PTC during the study period. The values in this variable are cents per kWh, as stated in each state's PTC policy.
The investment tax credit variable is defined as the percentage of the investment cost it covers; it has a non-zero value if the state in which the landfill is located had an ITC during the study period.
The state grant is included as a dummy variable, ignoring various requirements and grant amount. State grants that were excluded are those that mandate innovative, non-commercialized technology or are given to support research of renewable projects instead of facility construction.
The second category of variables includes electricity and natural gas prices. The major source of revenue for an LFGE project is the sales revenue of electricity or natural gas.
Electricity and gas price data were obtained from the US Energy Information Administration (2012). The electricity price is the annual average retail electricity price to end-users in the state.
The natural gas price is the annual average city gate natural gas price by state and year, provided by the US Energy Information Administration (2012). The citygate is a point or measuring station at which a distributing gas utility receives gas from a natural gas pipeline company or transmission system. These data are real prices with the base year 1991 and are in dollars per thousand cubic feet. The variable ranges from $1.67 to $7.81, with an average of $4.07.
A complication with electricity and gas prices is that project decisions are based on the expected price of electricity or gas in the future period when the commodity would be sold.
Since an LFGE project is typically operated for about 15 years, an accurate measure of revenue would be the discounted value of the electricity price during the 15 years after a project is open.
However, it is difficult to obtain the data on expected energy prices. As an alternative, lagged price can be used because price expectations are often based on past experience. 4 An average of the past, present, and future prices also can be used as a proxy. In the analysis, the average energy price of three years (previous, present, and next) is used to capture the expected price.
The third category, the methane production potential of a landfill, is an important determinant of the economic feasibility of an LFGE project because an LFGE system has economies of scale (Jaramillo and Matthews 2005) . LFG production is mainly determined by the size of the waste volume (waste in place), age of the waste, moisture content captured by precipitation, and temperature (Rajaram et al. 2011) . Two other factors-ownership type and distance to the nearest power grid-play an important role and are worth further discussion.
Our interviews with several landfill owners and developers suggest that a distinct difference exists between private landfill developers and public landfill owners. The major motivation for private LFGE developers is the profitability of the project, including tax credits and electricity prices. On the other hand, managers of public landfills adopt waste-to-energy projects as a public service-to mitigate harmful emissions, for example, or provide energy to a nearby public facility, such as a local prison or a waste water treatment facility. Another distinction between public and private landfills is that public landfills are not subject to tax, and thus cannot benefit from tax credits, such as ITC and PTC. Although it is probable that private and public owners would have different criteria in deciding whether to build an LFGE project, the direction of the effect is ambiguous. That is, a private landfill owner might be face stronger incentives than a public official for developing a potential source of profit. But public landfill managers might have better access to public funds and may feel less of the risk in developing a project. In our data set, about 60 percent of landfills are public.
The second factor is the distance to the nearest power grid. Although the cost of installing a transmission line typically comprises a small portion (approximately 5 percent) of the project cost, the costs depend on the distance to the power grid, making it an important factor in project decision. According to Chen and Greene (2003) , the cost of interconnection can vary from $20,000 to $500,000. To incorporate this factor into our study, we obtained data from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory that indicate the straight-line distance from a landfill to the nearest transmission line. It is worth noting that the transmission lines recorded in the database are rated as low as 13 kilovolts, but some transmission lines with a rating below 100 kilovolts may be missing in the data. that the levels would be higher in later years, not only for adopters but for nonadopters as well.
Investment and production tax credits do not differ significantly between adopter and nonadopter landfills. On the other hand, state grants are more available to adopter landfills than to nonadopter landfills. Even before a decision to adopt a project, the probability that an adopter landfill would have a grant program in its state is 15 percent compared to 10 percent for nonadopters, with the probability being 20 percent after project adoption.
Adopter landfills tend to be located in states with higher electricity price regardless of time period Adopter landfills faced electricity prices of 6.57 and 6.63 cents per kWh before and after project adoption, whereas nonadopter landfills face a much lower price of 6.07 cents per kWh. Natural gas prices for adopter landfills were more than $1 per thousand cubic feet higher.
However, as in the case of the RPS, this may reflect generally increasing natural gas prices. It is clear that adopter landfills tend to have larger amounts of waste than do nonadopters.
Adopters and nonadopters do not differ in precipitation and temperature overall, but the larger the amount of waste, the larger the difference is between adopters and nonadopters in terms of precipitation and temperature. This is shown in the averages of interaction variables between the log(waste) variable and the precipitation and temperature variables. The average age at which a landfill adopts a project is around 28 years. It can also be observed that nonadopter landfills are farther from the power grid by about 0.7 kilometers. It appears that about 64 percent of nonadopters are public landfills and 44 percent of adopters are publicly owned.
Empirical Model
The goal of our empirical analysis is to investigate the determinants of the decision to adopt an LFGE project, particularly the role of government policy. The econometric model starts from the assumption that the decision to adopt an LFGE project is dictated by cost and benefit
considerations. An LFGE project will be developed if the benefit of doing so is larger than the cost, both of which are expressed in terms of total present discounted value over the project lifetime.
As discussed earlier in the paper, the costs of LFGE projects include up-front fixed costs (the gas collection system, generating equipment, and grid connection) and operating costs (administration, operation, and maintenance). The benefits of LFGE projects are determined by the revenue from electricity and natural gas sales. The output level is determined by landfill characteristics, such as waste in place and landfill age. In addition, a variety of incentives can enable LFGE projects to break even.
We characterize the net (present discounted) benefit of developing LFGE projects to landfill owners (relative to not developing) as a function of these factors: ,
Where i is a landfill index and t is a year index. is a vector including non-policy variables that may affect the net benefit, such as landfill characteristics and electricity prices. is a vector including policy variables, such as RPS design parameters (e.g., target level, eligible generation technologies, and features of renewable energy credits) and federal and state incentives (interacting with landfill characteristics when appropriate). captures time-invariant landfill characteristics, such as landfill design or climate condition, that may affect project benefit. is year fixed effects to capture factors that affect all landfills, such as progress in generation technology. Both and control for factors that are unobservable but may affect the decision making of landfill owners. is a vector of parameters to be estimated based on data (e.g., revealed decisions that landfill owners have made). is the random error term that captures idiosyncratic factors.
Our goal of the empirical analysis is to assess the importance of the policy variables in on LFGE adoption decisions. The causal inference relies on the exogeneity of these variables.
Although one might argue that policies could be set in response to or anticipation of unobserved factors that affect LFGE adoption decisions, we believe that this is unlikely especially after we include time fixed effects and state fixed effects in our benchmark model. The four policies we examine are determined at the national and state levels, and we use time fixed effects and state fixed effects to control for national and state level unobservables. In addition, the polices apply to the investment or production of renewable energy of any type, and LFGE projects represent a very small share of renewable energy production-less than 2 percent of the renewable electricity generation capacity in 2013, for example.
For a landfill i that has not adopted an LFGE project by year t, the (conditional) probability of adopting a LFGE project by this landfill at year t, denoted by is:
.
The above expression is the hazard function in survival analysis. We organize the data into the (unbalanced) panel data structure and formulate the survival model as a discrete choice model with unobserved heterogeneity. Assuming with a logistic distribution (as is often done in the choice-modeling literature), the probability has the following closed form:
Given that is unobserved by researchers, we employ a random effects representation for unobserved factors, . The estimation method for this type of model is well established (Train 2003) . For a given landfill that has not adopted an LFGE project during the data period, t=1,2, . . . T, the joint probability of these T decisions conditional on observed variables , and year dummies is:
is the cumulative density function of and is a vector of parameters to characterize the distribution. In the estimation, the researcher can specify the distribution and estimate together with . It is common to assume that has a normal distribution with mean zero and is a scalar for the standard deviation. The integral in the above equation can be approximated using simulations or the quadrature method.
For a landfill that has adopted an LFGE project at year k, the joint probability of the k decisions before year k+1 is:
With these joint probabilities, we can express the log-likelihood function over all landfills in the data. The parameters and can be estimated using the simulated maximum likelihood method. ,
where is simulated choice probabilities. In the case of a landfill that has not adopted an LFGE project by time T, it is used to simulate the choice probability defined in equation (4).
We approximate using Gauss-Hermite quadrature with S points (we use 100 points in our analysis):
is the sth quadrature node and is the weight. The choice probability also can be simulated using other techniques, such as randomized Halton sequences, which provide similar results to those using quadrature. The first specification does not control for landfill unobservables, while the second one does in a random effects logit framework, which is our preferred specification. Landfill unobservables, such as proximity to demand sources, could be potentially important in LFGE adoption decisions. 5 We use a normal distribution to characterize these unobservables. The implicit assumption in the random effects logit model is that landfill unobservables are not correlated with observed variables. This is likely to be the case for the policy variables that are determined at the state or national levels.
Estimation and Simulation Results

Parameter Estimates
The results from the logit model show that none of the policy variables have statistically significant coefficient estimates. The only variables that have impacts on adoption decisions are natural gas prices, waste in place, and age. The random effects logit model produces results that are quite different. The estimate of the standard deviation of the normal random effects is quite large, confirming the importance of landfill unobservables.
There are three important findings from the random effects logit model. First, both RPS and ITC have positive and significant effects on LFGE adoption decisions. Their economic magnitude will be discussed in the simulation section. As previously discussed, landfill owners can sell the renewable energy credits that are issued as part of the RPS regulations, adding to the revenues of an LFGE project. The presence of an RPS regulation also makes it easier for LFGE project owners to enter into a contract to sell the generated electricity.
The ITC can be used to offset the fixed investment cost of building a project. An LFGE facility is a capital-intensive business, with investment costs ranging from $850,000 to $4.5 5 For example, the Brown Station Road Sanitary Landfill, located in Upper Marlboro, Maryland, developed an LFGE project as a source of power to the nearby Prince George's County correction facility. Another LFGE project, in the City of Toledo, Ohio, was developed to provide power to the city's waste water treatment plant in the anticipation of high power prices. million, with a typical project cost of $1.5 million (Chen and Greene 2003) . Thus, an average ITC of 35 percent would offset approximately half a million dollars for a typical landfill project.
Second, several variables that could affect the revenue stream of LFGE projects have significant effects. High natural gas prices, the size of landfill, and high temperature and moisture all lead to a higher probability of LFGE adoption. The coefficient estimates on the two age variables suggest that the probability of adoption peaks around age 40. Methane generation typically starts 1 to 3 years after the waste is dumped in the landfill and peaks at 5 to 7 years. Almost all gas is produced within 20 years after the waste is dumped. Since a landfill generally accepts waste for around 30 years, the peak amount of methane would be generated 25 to 40 years after a landfill is open, consistent with the model findings.
Third, longer distance to the grid and public ownership both have negative impacts on LFGE adoption. Interconnection to a power grid is crucial to generating revenue from electricity sales, and the cost of interconnection depends on the distance from a landfill site to the grid.
Privately and publicly owned landfills operate with different incentive structures. A private landfill owner has an incentive to build a profitable LFGE project because it would directly affect income. This incentive does not apply in the same way to the manager of a public landfill.
Profit generated from a public project is likely to be added to the municipality's budget.
Policy Simulations
In this section, we first simulate the impacts of the four policies on LFGE adoption based on the coefficient estimates of the random effects logit model. We then estimate the environmental and health benefits from these policy-induced adoptions. Table 5 presents simulation results. Based on the data, column 1 shows the number of landfills that did not adopt LFGE projects but were subject to one of the four policies at some point in time during our data period from 1991 to 2010. Column 2 gives the number of landfills that adopted projects and also were subject to one of the four policies at some point in time during our data period. Column 3 presents the simulated policy impacts based on the parameter estimates from the random effects logit. To conduct the simulations, we generate 250 random draws for each landfill in our data from a standard normal distribution to capture the random effects. We also generate 250 random draws for each observation (landfill-year) from a logit distribution for the error term. Based on these draws, we calculate the average profit of adoption for each landfill-year observation based on equation 1 and assign the adoption decision to be one for a landfill when the profit first turns positive during our data period.
The policy impacts are measured in terms of the number of LFGE projects that were adopted due to the policies. They are calculated as the differences in the total number of LFGE projects with and without the policy from the simulations described above. The RPS policy as implemented in different states resulted in 6 LFGE projects out of 146 projects that were subject to this policy. ITC had a relatively larger impact: it led to the adoption of 7 LFGE projects out of 46 projects that were subject to the policy. The effects from the PTC and state grants are small and are not statistically different from the estimation. The last row suggests that without these four policies, about 16 of the 277 LFGE projects in the data would not have been adopted. Table 6 presents a cost-benefit analysis of the ITC and RPS policies. Column 1 presents the amount of methane emissions reduced by implementing each of the two policies. We calculated these figures using the LFGE benefits calculator provided on the USEPA Landfill Methane Outreach Program website. 6 The calculator uses an LFGE capacity value as an input to estimate the amount of electricity generated per year and then the amount of methane used per year to generate the electricity. For this analysis, a sample average capacity of 1.52 megawatts was used. Because the calculator yields the amount of methane reduced per year, we multiplied the resulting figure by 15 years, which is the typical life span of an LFGE project.
Column 2 presents the cost per unit of carbon dioxide reduction, incurred in implementing each renewable policy. The cost of implementing the ITC is estimated by foregone tax revenues. Because a typical LFGE project is estimated to have an investment cost of $1.5 million (Chen and Greene 2003) and the average ITC covers 35 percent of this cost, the government will pay on average $525,000 worth of tax credits for each LFGE project it supports.
This means that the seven projects that benefited from the ITC cost the government a total of $3.675 million in foregone tax revenue. Dividing this figure by the total emissions reduction (column 1), produces column 2-the government cost of reducing one ton of carbon-dioxide equivalent. The cost for implementing the RPS is estimated as the deadweight loss incurred when electricity prices deviate from the optimal market equilibrium due to increased generation costs (Palmer et al. 2010) . This is also presented in column 2 in dollars/tonCO 2 e.
An LFGE project achieves two types of emissions reductions. The first type is the direct emissions reduction, achieved when methane is transformed into carbon dioxide via burning in an engine or a flare system. The second is the avoided emissions, which occur because the LFGE project supplies power that otherwise would have been produced elsewhere.
The US EPA's New Source Performance Standards require landfills built after May 30, 1991, with a capacity larger than 2.5 million mega-grams or 2.5 million cubic meters to install a LFG flare system. For the landfills that are under this regulation, the true emissions reduced by the RPS and ITC would be only the avoided emissions, presented in rows 4 and 5 of Table 6 .
Unfortunately, this notion cannot be applied to the cost of RPS because only the final unit cost of carbon dioxide reduction is given. Thus, the figure of $14 per ton CO 2 e is used for the cost of implementing RPS, regardless of the New Source Performance Standards regulation.
Columns 3 and 4 present the social cost of carbon suggested by the Interagency Working Group (IWG 2013) , an estimate of the social cost of emitting 1 additional ton of carbon dioxide, accounting for factors including but not limited to agricultural productivity, human health, property damages from increased flood risks, and the value of ecosystem services. The cost varies depending on the year in which the greenhouse gas is emitted and on the discount rate applied. Because it is difficult to simulate the years in which the LFGE projects are adopted, the benefits of emissions reduction are represented by the social cost of carbon in the year 2010.
Two discount rates of 5 percent and 3 percent are considered.
The net social benefit of each policy is presented in columns 7 and 8. It indicates that the ITC is clearly cost-effective, although the magnitude varies depending on the discount rate applied to the social cost of carbon. With a discount rate of 5 percent, the ITC brings a total net benefit of $217.7 million, whereas a 3 percent discount rate would mean the benefit is a smaller $69.9 million. With a 5 percent discount rate, the net benefit from the RPS is negative, although a lower discount rate of 3 percent brings the total net benefit to $109.4 million.
Conclusions
Along with various harmful toxins, landfill gas is the third-largest anthropogenic emitter of methane in the United States. In 2011, 103 million metric tons CO 2 e of methane was emitted from landfills in the United States, accounting for 18 percent of the total US methane emissions.
With growing concern over greenhouse gas mitigation and energy security, landfill gas has been promoted as a source of energy through state grants, investment tax credits, government purchases, and more recently by state-level renewable portfolio standards. We assess the effectiveness and net economic benefits of different renewable energy policies in promoting landfill-gas-to-energy projects by quantifying the increase in probability of project adoption induced by government subsidies and regulations.
Using a detailed dataset supplied by the USEPA on virtually all landfills across the country, we empirically examine the adoption decision of LFGE projects from 1991 to 2010 among these landfills with a set of rich covariates including policy variables, landfill physical characteristics, and energy prices. We employ a random effects logit model to characterize the adoption decisions while controlling for unobserved individual landfill characteristics, which could range from the risk aversion of the landfill owner to the proximity of the landfill to a potential power buyer. The empirical findings show that landfill age, weather, amount of waste, distance to grid, and public versus private ownership are factors that have a statistically significant effect on LFGE project adoption. Among the four policies evaluated in the model, a 10 percent increase in the target level of an RPS result in a 0.5% increase in the probability that a project is built. A 10% increase in the investment tax credit boosts the probability by 4.5 percent.
Model simulations based on parameter estimates suggest that seven LFGE projects built from 1991 to 2010 were induced by ITCs and six by RPSs. The combined effect of the four policies is that 16 additional LFGE project were adopted in the study period.
Our cost-benefit calculations take into account tax expenditures, deadweight loss, and social benefits of reduced carbon dioxide emissions. The calculations show that the investment tax credit is a cost-effective policy in promoting LFGE projects despite the uncertainty involved in valuing the social cost of carbon emissions. The cost-benefit comparison for the PRS policy is ambiguous and sensitive to the discount rate, even within the conventional range of 3 percent to 5 percent.
US Environmental Protection Agency.2014. Draft Inventory of US Greenhouse Gas Emissions
and Sinks: 1990 Sinks: -2012 Notes: The number of landfill-year observations is 27,311. The bold cells denote coefficient estimates that are significant at the 10 percent level. The dependent variable is zero for the observations with no landfill-gas-to-energy project and one otherwise. The partial effects (P.E.), describing the marginal effect of a variable on the probability of adoption, are averaged across all observations. The random effects logit model assumes a normal distribution for unobserved landfill characteristics. The approximation uses 100-point Gauss-Hermite quadrature. S.E = standard error. Notes: Column 1 lists the number of landfills that had no landfill-gas-to-energy (LFGE) projects but were subject to one of the four policies at some point in time during our data period from 1991 to 2010. Column 2 gives the number of landfills that had an LFGE project and were subject to one of the four policies at some point in time during our data period. Column 3 is obtained from simulations based on the estimates from the random effects logit model. It presents the number of LFGE projects that are adopted due to the policies. Column 3 of the last row suggests that without these four policies, about 16 of the 277 LFGE projects in the data would not have been adopted. mmt CO2e/yr=million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalents per year. Notes: Column 1 shows the total amount of methane reduced by implementing each policy, expressed in million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalents (CO2e). Column 2 shows the cost of each policy, expressed in dollars per ton CO2ereduced by the policy. Columns 3 and 4 show the social benefits of reducing 1 ton CO2ewith discount rates 5% and 3%, respectively. Columns 5 and 6 present the net benefit of each policy, derived by subtracting the cost from the benefits. Columns 7 and 8 are the total net benefits of each policy, derived by multiplying the net benefits by the total emissions reduction.
